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This article revisits the Niemeyer mission to Australia in 1930 and
shows how it facilitated the entry of  local economists into the art of
policy making. Until then the Scullin government had little regard
for the worth of  academic economists, a view shared by bankers and
central bankers alike. With Niemeyer’s dogmatic advice considered
too draconian by a vacillating government, Australian economists,
led by L. F. Giblin and D. B. Copland, were galvanised into providing
a more palatable alternative. This advice eventually transformed
into the Premiers’ Plan which complemented the devaluation and
wage cut, both of  which had been implemented in January 1931.
While the Plan in its entirety was deflationary it was a more equita-
ble and imaginative blueprint than Niemeyer’s.
 
INTRODUCTION
Sir Otto Niemeyer has a special place, even infamy, in twentieth century Austra-
lian history. While the literature has celebrated the political, economic and impe-
rial aspects of  the Niemeyer mission to Australia, none have explored the impact
of  it upon the local economics profession. Accessing new archival sources, this
article re-evaluates the Niemeyer mission, showing in particular, how it served
as a catalyst for the mobilisation of  local economic expertise. The publicity and
controversy surrounding the visit, together with the draconian advice that flowed
from Niemeyer’s lips, gave Australian economists recognition and an opportunity
to exercise what would prove a more acceptable approach to Australia’s woes.
The article proceeds by examining the economic preconditions which led to
Scullin accepting the idea of  the Bank of  England sending a mission to Australia.
The article also highlights some progenitors to the Niemeyer mission. Before this,
a brief  outline on the Australian economics profession and their analytical vision
and contribution to economic policy is appropriate. The article concludes by
underlining the accidental but positive outcomes that ensued from Niemeyer’s
visit.
    
GRIM FOREBODINGS
In the history of  the Commonwealth, no administration has been more challenged
by economic circumstances as confronted the Scullin Government. Scullin took
office only days before the Wall Street Crash of  October 1929. Yet for all the scale
of  the undertaking Labor was elected into, many had foreshadowed that the day
of  reckoning was coming for Australia. During the federal election campaign of
1929, Scullin warned voters that Australia was heading into a horrendous eco-
nomic situation by incurring an excessive level of  foreign debt to finance infra-
structure projects at a time when export prices were softening.
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 Scullin’s Jeremiad
warnings had a tragic element. As Robertson, his biographer remarked: ‘It is often
the fate of  prophets to be ignored; but it does not always follow that the prophet
is destroyed by the calamity he has foreseen.’
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 Scullin’s greatest tragedy was that
while having an appreciation of  the economic problems besetting Australia, he
shunned, until too late, the advice of  economists.
A survey of  the economic conditions prevailing in the late 1920s illustrates the
debt-deflation trap which the Australian economy was tumbling into. For eight
years in the 1920s, Australia had imports running ahead of  exports with the debt
servicing costs met from the proceeds of  fresh borrowing. While there were
institutional checks, the prevailing psychological mood was one of  unbridled
optimism. In his study of  the economic philosophy guiding the Bruce-Page Gov-
ernment, Richmond linked the optimism of  ‘men, money and markets’, to a grand
imperial vision.
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 The loan proceeds financed a huge appetite for imports, which
left in turn, the federal government awash with customs duty. The bellwether
of  success for Bruce’s development schemes was judged in terms of  per capita
income, rather than the aggregative performance of  the economy.
The scale of Commonwealth, and even more importantly state government
loan undertakings, together with overdrafts, alarmed some in London. Keynes
remarked that Australia was ‘gravely embarrassed by the fall in the price of  their
staple exports’ and was therefore craven to borrow at ‘whatever rate lenders
demand of  them’.
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 While the Commonwealth’s trustee status ‘silenced tongues
and criticisms’ of  Australia’s borrowing excesses, the British Treasury was far from
subservient.
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 It had, for some time, been antagonistic to Australia’s assisted migra-
tion and land settlement scheme which saw Britain absorb some of  the interest
bill of  the Commonwealth’s borrowings. The £34 million agreement between the
states and the Overseas Settlement Office, an agency of  the British Government,
signed in 1925 was the most outstanding example of  this.
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 British Treasury
officials detected, moreover, how Australian politicians seemed more interested in
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welcoming the financial capital rather than the human capital aspect of  the
arrangement.
While the states had to take a quota of  British migrants, there was no com-
punction to retain them. Many in fact returned home, but Australia did not have
to remit the capital sunk into land settlement or infrastructure.
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 The Governor of
the Bank of  England, Montagu Norman would be well aware of  the antics by
Australian politicians because Commonwealth borrowings during this period had
to be embargoed to allow Britain’s return to the Gold Standard.
 
8
 
 Afterwards,
however, Norman facilitated Australian borrowing by offering good terms to deter
Australia turning to New York. Australia denied its position as a dependent
economy by engaging in a form of  ‘financial entrepreneurship’ playing the Lon-
don capital market agents off  their New York counterparts.
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There is general agreement that the depression in Australia was triggered by
exogenous factors that compounded the deep-seated internal problems fomenting
during the 1920s. The loss in export revenue of  some £40 million, together, with
the cessation of  borrowing of  some £30 million meant a loss in national income
of  some 10 per cent in 1930 alone.
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 With the cessation of  capital borrowing
ordered by the Bruce Government, servicing Australia’s huge overseas loan port-
folio would now have to be drawn from local resources.
Melbourne University economist Douglas Copland gave the best contempora-
neous account of  how Australia’s economic difficulties had arisen. He identified
four ‘danger-spots’ or ‘weaknesses’ in the economy, namely: the rising ratio of
interest payments to export revenue; the increasing levels of  tariff  assistance; the
disparity between Australian and foreign price levels and, not least, state and
Commonwealth deficit budgets. All these, Copland reasoned, would have neces-
sitated some adjustment for the economy notwithstanding the ongoing deteriora-
tion in the global economy.
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 Interestingly, Copland rejected the argument that
there had been extensive economic mismanagement. A dependent economy, he
said, was ‘only partially master of  its own house’; in that sense Australia had been
embarrassed by the calamitous fall in export prices.
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Where economists had expressed alarm at Australia’s insatiable demand for
funds and their dispersal into unproductive ventures, it barely registered. This
allocation of  funds supposedly went with the scientific administration ambitions
of  the Bruce Government lending a new air of  sophistication to policy develop-
ment.
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 With Scullin’s accession to power, the paradigm of  ‘development’ came
to an abrupt end. The Chairman of  the Commonwealth Bank Board, Sir Robert
Gibson, informed Scullin that budget deficits would no longer be sustained and
that he would not issue any more Treasury bills until commitments were given
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towards achieving budgetary equilibrium. There was dithering responding to the
problem simply because the Scullin Government had been elected on the promise
that it would shelter the working man from the economic blizzard.
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 Shaping a
meaningful response to the gathering storm was also hampered by adversarial
politics and complicated even further by the federal-state divide. While the Com-
monwealth and the six states were all regarded as equal partners, it was still an
era when citizens looked more to their state capitals than Canberra.
Colin White has argued that the delay or ‘policy vacuum’ in Australia coming
to terms with the twin shocks of  falling export prices and cessation of  capital
inflow, was essentially due to the absence of  a ‘central economic authority’.
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 The
Federal Treasury’s standing within the economy was elevated when the Australian
Loans Council was established as a statutory body in 1927. The Treasury acted
as the Council’s secretariat but its influence over economic policy was still mini-
mal. The Commonwealth Bank Board, in contrast, exercised primary control over
monetary policy and exerted a strong voice in the Premiers’ Conference regularly
held to deliberate upon the disbursement of  federal funds.
The Commonwealth Bank was not truly a central bank, partly because the
trading banks did not have to keep reserves or share commercial information with
it and indeed regarded it as a competitor. The Commonwealth Bank was, there-
fore, unable to exert control over the exchange rate or even gauge the depth of
Australia’s external reserves or ‘London funds’ held by trading banks. Nor did the
Bank Board totally possess the expertise that went with the art of  central banking.
For all his intransigence and ignorance of  central bank techniques, Gibson was
still the most important individual determining the course of  economic policy
during the depression.
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Gibson and his Board exercised some authority over interest rates, though the
more powerful banks could prove recalcitrant. On matters of  monetary doctrine,
the Bank Board rigorously upheld the stability of  the exchange rate and was
vigilant about ‘monetary credit’ abuse.
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 These decentralised and vague monetary
arrangements brought the banks into almost immediate friction with the Scullin
Government over the drain of  Australia’s reserves and cessation of  borrowing
from London. The fall in the London funds meant that the banks had to restrict,
quite properly, their advances. Labor politicians saw this subsequent credit
squeeze, however, as deliberate sabotage.
Gibson’s problematic relationship with the new government unfolded in one
extraordinary scene. Scullin, fazed by the convention of  a seven-year term for the
Chairman of  the Bank Board, wanted to make Gibson’s reappointment condi-
tional on the premise that he render an undated resignation letter. When Gibson
 
14 Scullin at first took a remarkably benign view of  unfolding developments. On 21 November 1929
he publicly intoned ‘...we do not view the future with alarm – our troubles will soon be over.
Cited in Anstey, Memoirs, p. 371.
15 White, 
 
Mastering risk
 
, p. 190.
16 Giblin 
 
Central bank
 
.
17 Melville 
 
Transcript
 
, 26. National Library of  Australia (hereafter NLA).
    
rebuffed the offer, Scullin supinely gave him another seven-year term.
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 Gibson
was reappointed essentially because of  the immense psychological reassurance his
presence gave to the local and international banking community. Gibson soon
showed his mettle by informing Scullin before his departure for an Imperial
Conference in London that the Federal Government implement immediate
expenditure cuts or face impending bankruptcy with the internal and external
loans fast maturing.
THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMICS PROFESSION IN THE 1930s
Australian economics in the late 1920s was a fledgling university discipline with
only six chairs (Melbourne, Sydney, Hobart, Adelaide, Brisbane and Perth). It was
a Cinderella science but the economic challenges facing Australia held promise
for the profession.
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 The economists at Australia’s disposal were to prove a remark-
able vintage.
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 Like their British counterparts, Australian politicians had begun to
solicit advice from economists. There was something within the nature of  the
Australian economics profession which lent itself  to giving practical advice rather
than engaging in theoretical research. Giblin later reflected upon this attribute:
 
In Australia economists are a particular tribe. Rarely are they nourished by the pure
milk of  the word. Mostly they have been advisers to governments for many years –
permanently or intermittently, publicly or privately. Governments do not love them but
are inclined to believe honest. . .They are frequently more practical and realistic than
businessmen...They are resented of  course by sectional business interests. The word of
complaint or abuse is ‘academic’; but, in truth, they are the least academic of  God’s
creatures.
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In like spirit, L. G. Melville, reviewing the events of  1931, recalled that ‘Essentially
we were all pragmatists dealing with applied economics, applied to practical
problems that were developing very rapidly.’
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In terms of  ranking, Melbourne was prominent because it was the home of  the
Economic Society of  Australia and New Zealand. The Society was, in part,
sponsored by the banking and business community and brought businessmen,
economists and public servants under the one roof. Considered politically safe,
Copland was regarded as ‘the proper custodian and expander.. .of  absolute and
unbending economic laws.’
 
23
 
 Copland set out to secure the bridge between town
and gown by offering a degree in commerce. It was rapturously received.
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At Sydney, Richard Mills held the chair and was intent upon building a factory
of  local economic expertise. Despite Melbourne’s prominence, Sydney would
boast that it possessed Australia’s only ensemble of  professionally-trained
economists.
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Copland entered into the debate over monetary policy when Australia’s finan-
cial link with London came under pressure with the calamitous fall in export
prices during 1929–30. Under the rules of  the game, Australia could only recover
external balance by a severe deflation brought about by a direct reduction in bank
credit consistent with her dwindling London funds. Inspired by Keynes’ 
 
Tract
 
,
Copland reasoned that internal price stability should rank before exchange rate
stability and that the transmission of  large movements in credit, via the external
account, be avoided for the sake of  economic stability. In a lecture to the Eco-
nomic Society in June 1930 Copland provoked controversy by urging a break with
sterling. Copland set out to enlighten high and financial opinion away from the
Anglo-Saxon fetish that a unit of  money, in this case the Australian pound,
become a variable unit and not something fixed in terms of  gold. It was to prove
a long struggle.
Before Copland’s lecture upon monetary policy Australian high politics had,
as mentioned, established the precedent of  calling upon the ‘experts’ to advise
upon aspects of  public policy. It was the Bruce Government’s appointment of  the
Brigden Committee in 1928, to review the Australian tariff  that first made the
name of  Australian economics. In the foreword to the 
 
Report of  the Tariff  Committee
 
Bruce hailed it as ‘a free gift to the Australian people’. This was a reference not
just to the 
 
Report
 
’s clarity and lucidity but also how economists laboured without
compensation.
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 They did not labour in vain, however.
That effort mirrored comparable developments in Britain where extra-parlia-
mentary economic expertise, in the guise of  the Economic Advisory Committee,
was pursued with some vigour.
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 Bruce’s ‘eyes and ears’ in London, R. G. Casey,
the liaison officer with the Foreign Office, wrote of  the rising power of  economics:
‘Economics was beginning to show signs of  asserting itself ’ and ‘being recognised
as the sharp and effective tool of  those in power’.
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Calling upon a repository of  economic wisdom was also in the new-found spirit
of  ‘scientific administration’ or ‘salvation through science’.
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 By 1929 Bruce had
a Bureau of  Economic Research on the statute books.
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 Bruce’s rapture with
economics and economists, however, was at odds with his countrymen’s dislike of
scientific economics.
 
31
 
 In like regard, the Labor Party attributed the escalation in
unemployment between 1927 and 1929 to the high volume of  both imports and
immigration. The Scullin Government subsequently decided to postpone assisted
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migration and abolish the Development and Migration Commission.
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action ruffled British feathers, especially since it was an undertaking managed
jointly with Whitehall.
The idea of  a Bureau of  Economic Research, too, was abandoned. Labor had
already voted against the proposal whilst in opposition. In complete ignorance
of  what economists said about the tariff, Arthur Blakely accused them of  being
‘brought up in schools of  economic thought and ideas quite foreign to conditions
prevalent in Australia’. ‘The economist’ he continued ‘is academic, conservative
and anti-working class and lives in a world of  his own’.
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 Scullin, too, took a swipe
at the ostensibly ‘academic’ orientation of  the people who would staff  the Bureau:
‘The textbooks teem with the opinions of  the so-called leading economists of  the
world on the subject of  free trade and protection.. .[The people] are not con-
cerned with the opinions of  learned persons who talk about a wonderful flow of
trade through uninterrupted channels’.
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A PRECURSOR TO NIEMEYER
In the same year economists reported upon the tariff, Australia as Gilbert put it,
‘invited trouble’ by having an official British Economic Mission come out and
assess the condition of  the Australian economy.
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 Bruce had hoped to use the
Mission to alleviate growing concern in the City over Australia’s rate of  borrow-
ing.
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 However, the Mission in a reprise on Whitehall opinion, criticised Australia’s
new protectionism, especially, the practice of  wage indexation. It encouraged the
Bruce Government to square the circle by attempting industrial relations reform.
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The concern about Australian cost levels drew one member of  the British
Economic Mission to note: ‘The nub of  the problem had been identified as the
great and growing costs of  production, for which growing tariffs and corre-
spondingly growing costs of  living and of  labour are primarily responsible, and
which are further enhanced by the unremunerative expenditures of  borrowed
money.’
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Australian economists were heartened by the Mission since it assailed the
intrusive nature of  government intervention within the economy, particularly the
link between tariffs and wage arbitration. The Mission guardedly found Austra-
lia’s economy to be fundamentally sound in that she could meet existing debts
and provide for local services.
 
39
 
 It concluded, however, that Australia ‘had been
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mortgaging the future too deeply and would do well to restrict her expenditure
of  borrowed money for development’.
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 It echoed, therefore, the British Treasury
concerns about the end-uses of  borrowed capital, particularly the flagrant abuse
of  the land settlement scheme. The general impression formed in London from
the report, as Casey relayed to Bruce, was that ‘ . . . they do not think we have been
very clever with our nation planning in the past’.
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 Some correction, it was true,
was in the offing once the Australian authorities came to an orderly arrangement
with their financial agreement over loan raisings, but the damage had been done.
Neutralising to some extent, the impact of  the Mission’s findings, especially on
protection, was the Brigden Committee’s findings, which gave qualified support
to the Australian tariff.
Appreciative of  the economic problems confronting them, Scullin and The-
odore asked the London-based Australian businessman, W. S. Robinson, to make
secret representations to the Bank of  England about deferring an impending loan
maturing. Robinson was given short shrift by ‘our old friend’ Sir Ernest Harvey:
‘Please don’t ask for that which perforce I must refuse.’
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 Giblin felt the Bank of
England’s action was ‘very cold. Its attitude was rigid.. .Australia must solve its
own trouble for itself ’.
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 Australia, by dint of  some years of  negative, but for the
most part, accurate reporting, had become the ‘bad boy of  the Commonwealth’
and an example to be made of.
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THE NIEMEYER MISSION
Local economists were probably taken as much by surprise as most Labor Party
officials were when informed that the Bank of  England was despatching Sir Otto
Niemeyer to undertake an evaluation of  the Australian economy’s finances. While
there has been some controversy about who invited Niemeyer out, Sir Robert
Gibson told a leading Melbourne stockbroker that it was he who had arranged
the visit.
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 In the literature Scullin is often portrayed as having been somewhat
inveigled into accepting a visit from Bank of  England officials.
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 This is not so.
Given Scullin’s unilateral decision concerning Gibson’s reappointment, accepting
a visitor from Threadneedle Street gave the financial community further psycho-
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logical assurance. Scullin entertained the possibility that the Bank of  England
might accommodate Australia with a loan to cover the short term overdrafts to
English banks in London if  his government followed Niemeyer’s advice.
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It could be said that the local nucleus of  economists was also grateful for
Niemeyer’s visit, since it added a much-needed degree of  gravitas to the problems
at hand. Giblin sent Niemeyer a note of  welcome on behalf  of  his colleagues.
 
48
 
A. C. Davidson, the economically enlightened General Manager of  the Bank of
New South Wales, hailed Niemeyer’s arrival as ‘the first occasion in half  a century
that economic talks may be brought home forcibly to the people of  Australia and
those who rule over them’.
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When Niemeyer, his economic adviser Professor T. E. Gregory of  the London
School of  Economics, and an Australian-born assistant from the Bank of  England,
Richard Kershaw, arrived in July 1930, they were unaware of  the political storm
they were to cause. For Niemeyer would bring the house of  English orthodox
economics down upon Australia’s head. It would materialise in him attacking the
‘Ark of  the Covenant’, Australia’s living standards.
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 At one point, towards the end
of  his sojourn, Niemeyer actually put out a public statement telling of  the circum-
stances that led to his invitation to Australia.
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 He was here, palpably at the
invitation of  the Commonwealth Government, following a suggestion by the Bank
of  England that an independent study of  Australia’s finances be undertaken.
Niemeyer’s brief  was to diagnose the nature of  the Commonwealth’s economic
problems and put forward advice as to its resolution. It afforded London another
opportunity to wage a critique of  Australia’s pattern of  economic development.
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Moreover, Niemeyer entertained a secret agenda, namely to steel the resistance
among local trading banks to Theodore’s Central Reserve Bank legislation – a
development the Bank of  England looked upon with some trepidation.
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Niemeyer was bombarded by correspondence offering advice on what was
ailing the Australian economy. Much of  the correspondence pinned the blame on
Australia’s cost structure upon the tariff-arbitration system lending support to
what Niemeyer had in mind to say. The South Australian Labor leader,
R. L. Butler, informed Niemeyer that Australia’s problems had all to do with the
political patronage of  public works. This seemingly registered with Niemeyer
because it is one of  the few unsolicited letters to which he made more than a
cursory reply. Butler wrote about the possibility of  privatising the national assets
that Australia had spent millions in developing. To correct Australia’s trade
account, Butler raised the possibility of  manufacturing exports.
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 Niemeyer agreed
that manufacturing exports were a possibility but he had ‘some doubt’ whether
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this would be achieved because the margin between the wages of  England’s
industrial workers in the export industries and the Australian equivalent was
immense.
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 Butler was, as we shall see, to play a significant part in the unfolding
drama.
As an old Treasury man, Niemeyer might have been privy to a report written
by Skevington who had visited Australia the year before and made critical remarks
about Australians’ self-belief  in the great potential of  their country. He found ‘their
ignorance of  economics.. .pathetic’.
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 For his own part, Niemeyer would also be
only articulating what he had already written upon for the Bank of  England’s
edification.
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The high point of  Niemeyer’s fact-finding tour was his infamous address at the
Melbourne Conference of  Commonwealth and State Leaders where he told his
audience that the ‘cold facts must be faced’. His diagnosis of  Australia’s predica-
ment was blunt, if  not predictable: ‘In short, Australia is off  budget equilibrium,
off  exchange equilibrium, and faced by considerable unfunded and maturing
debts both internally and externally, in addition to which she has on her hands a
very large program of  loan works for which no financial provision has been
made’.
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 Niemeyer warned Australia had two years ‘to get its house in order’
before a tranche of  external debt matured in 1932. Niemeyer’s advice at the
Melbourne Conference was politely listened to and seemingly consented to in
resolution after resolution. However, the peculiarity of  Australia’s political and
institutional arrangements, especially the federal structure of  governance,
deprived Niemeyer of  having a single point on which he could concentrate his
pressure.
While in favour of  Niemeyer’s resolutions the states resented having to make
greater proportionate expenditure cuts than the Commonwealth.
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 The Scullin
Government, while agreeing that budgets had to be pruned, exercised a policy of
Micawberism. Niemeyer found the Australians’ resistance to buckling under dis-
concerting, believing they were far too optimistic about their country’s future
prospects.
Meanwhile, populist politicians like Jack Lang and Billy Hughes penned liter-
ature decrying the Niemeyer diagnosis and therapy. What irritated Niemeyer most
was the boundless optimism of  his hosts and the thought there must exist an easier
way out of  their predicament. Niemeyer vented his frustration in a missive to
Norman: ‘They are occupied half  the time saying that the present difficulties are
not their fault but somebody else’s – either Bruce’s or the London Markets or the
general perverseness of  the world and the other half  in trying to find ingenious
ways by which somebody else should help them out.’
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local papers that the British Government was still considering a proposal guaran-
teeing loans for further land settlement he cabled the Deputy Governor at the
Bank of  England, Sir Ernest Harvey:
Can you tell me whether there is any truth in this, as rumours have bad effect on these
optimists? Australia is a poor country, probably over-populated with a higher percentage
unemployed than U.K. Settlement hitherto has been very costly and unsuccessful; future
development at present seems to me insane.61
Niemeyer was horrified to learn, too, of  the activities of  Scullin in London. Apart
from seeking relief  for Australia’s war debts, Scullin had approached the Bank of
England about getting approval, or at least a vote of  confidence for his stand
against a Caucus proposal to extend the due date of  some maturing debt.62 Despite
Niemeyer’s warning to Scullin that London would not give him a warm reception,
the Australian Prime Minister asked whether the Bank would provide the money
to enable the Commonwealth to pay off  some five million pounds of  maturing
Treasury Bonds.63 Harvey, who had visited Australia in 1927 to advise upon
establishing a central bank, declined both requests; the second because it was
unheard of  and the first because the Scullin Government had, so far, not moved
to implement Niemeyer’s advice. Earlier, the Bank of  England, at Niemeyer’s
suggestion, was prepared to help finance the maturing of  Treasury Bonds in late
1930, but only if  the Scullin Government implemented the Melbourne resolu-
tions.64 Sir Richard Hopkins of  the British Treasury annotated the report of  the
interview between Scullin and Harvey with the comment: ‘It is a bad business.’65
In his diary Niemeyer was unflattering toward his hosts and quite unimpressed
with federal politicians, civil servants, bankers and other professionals.66 Niemeyer
confided to the official representative of  the British Government E. T. Crutchley,
that ‘He had had a lot to do with bankrupt countries but have never seen one
more utterly impotent to help itself ’.67
Even Gibson ‘staggered’ Niemeyer by prophesising – correctly as it turned out
– that Britain would go off  the Gold Standard within six months.68 Apart from
that indiscretion Niemeyer told Lady Gibson that her husband was ‘the most
61 Niemeyer to E. Harvey cablegram, 14 August 1930, Public Record Office (hereafter PRO):
T161/396/11935/02.
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outstanding figure of  all those I met’,69 and that ‘Australia could never repay
Sir Robert Gibson in thousands what he had saved the country in millions’.70
Niemeyer was also impressed by Leslie Melville, particularly his espousal of
deflationist economics that he recommended him to Gibson as the Common-
wealth Bank’s first economic adviser.71 Melville took up that appointment in
March 1931.72
Niemeyer’s unflattering appraisal of  Australia’s politicians sprang not just from
his highly developed sense of  personal superciliousness but also British Treasury’s
concerns about land settlement schemes. It also sprang from Montagu Norman’s
advice to distrust ‘all Australian Governments and Ministers’.73 The background
to this, as Casey informed Bruce, was that Norman had already found his advice
unheeded about setting an issue price on Australian loans floated in London.74
ENTER THE ECONOMISTS: MELBOURNE SCHOOL VERSUS 
MELBOURNE AGREEMENT
As mentioned, Copland’s less austere middle monetary policy was circulating
before Niemeyer gave his Melbourne address. It entailed real wage cuts in tandem
with devaluation. After receiving a copy of  Copland’s July lecture, Keynes told
him that he had ‘considerable sympathy with line’ being taking.75 Growing oppo-
sition to Niemeyer prescription gave the Copland approach wider currency. Mel-
bourne stockbroker Edward Dyason told the Acting-Treasurer, Joe Lyons, that
Niemeyer’s advice was ‘inimical to the national interest and dangerous to the
social fabric’.76 Giblin added his weight, telling his old friend Lyons that if  defla-
tionary policies were carried out Australia was headed for a ‘bad smash with the
chance of  revolution and chaos’.77 Lyons consequently commissioned Copland,
Giblin and Dyason to frame an alternative to Niemeyer. Copland later identified
this as the first instance where economists were called in to give official advice
upon how to combat the economic crisis. They had, in fact, already undertaken
a series of  meetings to ascertain the loss in national income and the means to
restore it. Copland later claimed that the basis of  what would become the Pre-
miers’ Plan was first outlined by economists at an ANZAAS meeting held in
69 Niemeyer to Lady Gibson, 1 January 1934. Latrobe library, Gibson Papers, Mss.10823.
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Brisbane in May 1930. Initially the economists, especially Melville, were coy
about involving themselves in public affairs. Melville was worried that ‘interfer-
ence by university economists in public affairs is a delicate matter because of  the
strong financial assistance rendered to universities by Australian governments’.78
Copland eschewed this reservation. The first step was to quantify the loss in real
income and then ensure that the loss be fairly distributed across the community.
This was made the first condition of  recovery. Real wages had to fall and index-
ation cease. As the Arbitration Court’s expert witness in the 1930 national wage
case, Copland took up the challenge with relish.
There was no record in Niemeyer’s diary or papers of  having met or corre-
sponded with Copland. Giblin, in his recollections to Walker, did report however
frequent clashing with Niemeyer, especially over protection.79 For his part, Niem-
eyer felt Giblin was ‘pretty disappointing’.80 Gregory did see Copland and Giblin,
a day before Niemeyer’s keynote address before the Melbourne Conference.
Gregory cryptically reported back that the conversation gravitated around two
points, the exchange rate and real wage cuts. Gregory posed the question to both
academics of  what was Australia’s optimal path out of  its depression, namely,
deflation or devaluation. He found Copland more careful in his qualifying analysis
than Giblin, but also more likely to be ‘inflationist’, by that, urging a rise in the
price level via devaluation. In the record of  that interview there is no mention of
Copland’s expedient, articulated in his 1930 Economic Journal article, of  how a
money wage cut would deliver a real wage cut. Giblin and Copland spoke rather
about how devaluation would suppress imports, and more importantly, give a
stimulus to primary and secondary industries coupled with compensating reduc-
tions in the tariff. Gregory insisted that primary producers would not escape a
raft of  rising costs due to the import bill increasing. The two Melbourne econo-
mists confided that they saw unemployment ballooning to 25 per cent. Signifi-
cantly, Copland mooted the idea of  ‘a general scaling down’ of  interest rates, but
Gregory thought it was not ‘a considered point of  view of  what was possible, on
his part’.81
Apart from this interview and his Fisher Lecture, Gregory kept well in the
background during his visit. His one contribution to the media, as events
unfolded, proved an interesting one. He refuted the Laborist argument then
extant, that a reduction in interest rates must precede wage cuts: ‘If  we look at it
strictly as an economic proposition, both rising rates of  interest and the growth
of  unemployment are evidence of  maladministration in Australian economic
affairs, and, from a strictly economic point of  view, you cannot assert that it is
unjust that interest rates remain high while wages fall if  the high rate of  interest
is unnecessary to attract capital and a lower rate is necessary to attract a demand
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for labour.’82 The deadlock would only be broken in January 1931 when the
Arbitration Court ordered a 10 per cent wage cut. Copland praised the decision
as a first step towards economic readjustment.83 Until then, the Melbourne school
issued a plan for economic readjustment encompassing both devaluation and the
monetising of  budget deficits with Treasury bills. It was a middle way between
inflation and deflation. It would allow the internal price level to return to pre-
depression levels. Like Davidson, Melville was aghast at the Melbourne price
stabilisation proposals while Shann, less opposed, identified the practical difficul-
ties of  implementing it with an obstructionist Commonwealth Bank. There were
fears too, that it gave support to the Labor Party’s plans for a centralised and
politically controlled central bank. Certainly the Melbourne school gave some
support to the notion of  price stabilisation in a bid to counter the external shocks
which, if  left untreated, spelt considerable deflation.
As hopes of  implementing the Melbourne Agreement receded Niemeyer wrote
to Hopkins: ‘This is an odd country, full of  odd people and odder theories.’84
Meanwhile Melville had, at Niemeyer’s urging, gone on the attack against the
Melbourne school, which was then considering Theodore’s idea of  price stabili-
sation achieved by a fiduciary issue.85 ‘Melbourne brains’ so antagonised Niem-
eyer that he cabled Harvey about ‘much wild talk in Caucus about expanding
credits and tots of  brandy inflation has supporters in Theodore and Melbourne
economists’.86 Niemeyer encouraged Melville to keep up the fight against ‘Cop-
land and Co’ and their ‘dangerous nonsense’, part of  which was about devalua-
tion.87 Niemeyer, along with the English-owned Melbourne banks, saw little logic
in Australia having to pay more to service its debt or imports. It was held that
primary producers would also extract little benefit because of  the higher costs
caused by the devaluation. In a dig at the Melbourne economists, Niemeyer
remarked how ‘curious a commentary it is on human psychology that the same
people talk in one breath of  the boundless potentialities of  Australia and in the
next of  the necessity of  writing down those potentialities by 20 per cent’.88 A
heartened Melville replied that the camp of  the stabilisationists was technically
reduced to monetising the deficits directly since the trading banks would not
expedite it by purchasing government securities and, if  that were to happen, there
would be a flight from currency. He sought Niemeyer’s opinion about Giblin’s
contention, reported in the press89 that ‘our best efforts at balancing the budget
were hopeless at the present time.’90 Niemeyer felt Giblin’s pessimism about
balancing the budget was symbolic of  a ‘quitter’ mentality he had found among
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his hosts. Niemeyer’s reply to Melville, a few days before he set sail for England,
rounded on Giblin and Copland’s ‘hopelessly academic’ measures as meaning
only one thing – inflation: ‘The fundamental fallacy of  course is the common
Australian assumption that it is the business of  the banks in general and the
Commonwealth Bank in particular to provide capital in the strict sense of  the
word. The provision of  capital is, of  course, no part of  the functions of  any bank.’91
Niemeyer remarked that there had already been some ‘considerable inflation’ in
the financing of  deficits; he speculated also where Australia would draw upon the
resources to balance forthcoming budgets or finance public works.
Niemeyer knew that the Melbourne Agreement would be in technical limbo
until the outcome of  the NSW state election was known. A victory for the
conservative leader, T. R. Bavin, would mean that the process of  budget balancing
in the strongest state in the Commonwealth could proceed and if  the Common-
wealth Government followed, a loan sponsored by the Bank of  England might
then be in prospect. Unfortunately, Bavin used the Niemeyer report as the basis
of  his campaign, giving the unfortunate impression that he was advocating econ-
omy and retrenchment at the dictate of  London.92 Lang, to Niemeyer’s horror,
mounted his entire electoral campaign opposing the Melbourne Agreement,
arguing instead for some form of  repudiation. Victory for Lang would therefore
be a severe blow to the Niemeyer plan and, as Norman told Hopkins, ‘the game
would be up’.93 When Lang won the election, Niemeyer judged that a London
issue would ‘now be out of  the question’94
Even on the day of  departure, Niemeyer still strove to expunge the inveterate
optimism of  his hosts, remarking to journalists that ‘there was not enough pessi-
mism around’.95 While he left Australia ‘to stew in her own juice’, Niemeyer had
enjoyed the celebrity, or infamy, his sojourn had provoked, telling the Governor
of  the Commonwealth Bank, E. R. Riddle, that he hated ‘being out of  the row’.96
Niemeyer’s departure, however, made it easier for Melville to seek a compromise
with the Melbourne economists in putting their signatures to a workable plan. In
late November the economists reconvened in Melbourne for a two-day meeting.
There they agreed that there must be immediate cutbacks to government spend-
ing. The 25 per cent loss in national income was being compounded by a loss in
business confidence which, in turn, was due to lack of  policy action by the
authorities. More interestingly, Copland and Giblin dropped the idea of  price
stabilisation because they lacked the requisite degree of  precision in monetary
targeting to restore prices to 1929 levels. J. B. Brigden also noted that the scheme
diverted attention away from the imperatives of  wage cuts and reducing govern-
ment expenditure.97 The economists issued another memorandum in January
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1931. Apart from again insisting upon wage cuts and restoring budgetary balance,
the economists now wanted a commensurate reduction in rentier income by
scaling down interest rates. The latter clause must have caused Melville and
Shann some unease but eight economists signed the memorandum.98 In that same
month Copland took Theodore’s fiduciary issue to task.99 January 1931, in fact,
was a critical month with economists playing a major part first in forcing a wage
cut to be imposed nationally and then delivering, through Davidson at the Wales
a 30 per cent devaluation. Copland, Shann and Melville persuaded Davidson to
bend to market realities and overthrow the carded rate.100 The last obstacle in
Australia’s economic rehabilitation was to address the matter of  public sector
deficits.
While many could foresee a looming financial crisis, some saw it as doing a
power of  good. Crutchley reported that ‘the Commonwealth Bank felt, as did
other competitive authorities, that a “crash” so long as it is internal in immediate
effect, was not only unavoidable but should be expected as the only way of  forcing
the Governments and the public to face facts and accept the hardships of  recon-
struction’.101 Theodore was of  the same inclination, wanting a crisis to force the
Commonwealth Bank to bend to his will. When informed of  Labor’s embrace of
the Theodore plan Niemeyer told the Governor of  NSW, Sir Philip Game: ‘I am
afraid.. .things have not got much better, as the little wanderer [Scullin] seems to
have gone over almost completely to the illusionist.’102 That expedient faltered in
the Senate resulting in further deadlock between the Commonwealth and states.
It was the South Australian Premier Butler’s casting vote upon the Loans Council
that broke the impasse. The establishment of  the Copland Committee comprised
of  economists and Treasury officials came forward with a homespun economic
plan. When Scullin succumbed to what later became known as the Premiers’ Plan,
Niemeyer felt vindicated: ‘I am still optimistic to think if  he [Scullin] had done
this last summer, as he was pressed to do, he would not only have found the task
a much simpler one but would by this time have seen Australia on the upgrade.
It is really extraordinary how politicians.. . fail to grasp the momentum with which
economic diseases spread if  they are not nipped in the bud’.103 When Niemeyer
left Australia he cabled Montagu Norman: ‘We have given them a concrete plan
to pull on and sooner or later even those who now hold back will follow it’.104
Norman agreed: ‘ . . .we have shown [the] Premiers a reasonable way of  avoiding
bankruptcy’.105 Later a placatory missive from Claude Reading, a member of  the
Commonwealth Bank Board, played upon Niemeyer’s vanity, assuring him that
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the subsequent Premiers’ Plan was ‘in effect merely going back to everything you
said when you were here and adopting the remedies which you included would
be necessary’.106 Forty years later this delusion continued when an obituary for
Niemeyer appeared in The Times stating that ‘the Australian people took his
diagnosis and his suggested cures in good part’.107
RETROSPECT
The Niemeyer mission provided local economists with an excellent opportunity
to present a fairer, homespun solution to Australia’s economic problems. This was
no mean achievement since the Labor Party up till then had shunned the advice
of  economists.108 The degree of  subtlety and nuance required to negotiate through
the crisis could only come from economists with an unerringly common touch.
They had to be able to tell parables to explain abstruse economics to ordinary
folk to generate the consensus for the measures needed. Giblin would later claim
that the solution of  Australian economists to their country’s predicament was quite
distinct from the Niemeyer blueprint which he believed was unrelentingly
harsh.109 It was, of  course, Niemeyer’s method of  application of  remedial policies,
together with his air of  superiority that proved mindlessly insensitive to political
realities that earned him lasting opprobrium. As R. W. Dalton, the senior British
trade representative noted: ‘Niemeyer was not the success he might have been;
he lost his head a bit, was tactless and did some very stupid things’.110 Niemeyer
had forsaken Keynes’ advice that with Australia’s export prices already depressed
it was ‘not a time to choose for pressing her too hard’.111 Even Niemeyer’s
strongest supporter, Sir Robert Gibson, chided him for his pessimism and for not
giving the Australian people enough credit to pull through.112
Of  course, it may well have been that Niemeyer was deliberately painting a
gloomy picture to force Australians to take notice – a point Copland and Gibson
felt quite necessary in the circumstances.113 On that score, Robinson later reported
to Theodore that all the Bank of  England had really wanted from Australian
authorities was a clear-cut policy that the country would balance its budget in
four or five years and that there would be no recourse to external loans in the
meantime. If  Australia subscribed to that, the Bank would do its utmost to help
the Commonwealth. This did not assuage the Melbourne economist, Gordon
Wood, who fumed years later: ‘The resentment of  the Niemeyer mission goes
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deeper than perhaps you have been led to expect. The personnel were unfortunate,
the job was badly handled and the general effect was almost disastrous, despite
the necessity for telling the Scullin Government the true facts of  the case’.114
Two years later after accepting Keynes’ invitation to give the 1933 Marshall
Lectures, Copland took delight at the sharp criticism by Cambridge economists
of  Niemeyer’s style and therapy.115 Poignantly, his lecture series was upon how
Australia’s brand of  unique economic policies and institutions helped extricate
the nation from depression.116 When published, they drew the attention of  Mon-
tagu Norman. In a confidential, never disclosed review, Norman believed that
Copland was about ’90 per cent right’ in claiming that the remedies applied by
Australian economists were suitable to her economic situation and national char-
acter.117 Acclamation from afar had come at last and from high authority.
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